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is in her 30's, particularly if that worker has never experienced
poverty, children, and the culture in which that client lives?
How would a sighted worker understand the complexity of
a client who is middle-aged, and newly blind? The authors'
conceptual developmental-ecological framework provides an
important backdrop for workers when facing these situations.
While there are no easy answers, the framework provides
guidelines for intervention and effective practice with clients
which remind one, again, to see the individual in the sea of
complexity and faced with a myriad of problems. The worker
needs to understand how clients manage and think about han-
dling such problems. The authors' framework forces practitio-
ners to focus on the individual rather than viewing them as
members of groups.
In conclusion, this is a very helpful and useful text in pre-
paring practitioners to work toward achieving a better un-
derstanding of the complexity between human behavior and
social work practice. It offers guidelines for dealing with indi-
viduals: it doesn't provide easy answers, but it offers direction
for helping clients. I would recommend this text in order to
better understand how practitioners can work more effectively
with individuals by putting themselves in the shoes of a client
and understanding the world from their perspective. In this
way we would be much closer to understanding the many cul-
tural and social pressures which exist for these clients. We may




James G. Dwyer, The Relationship Rights of Children. Cambridge
University Press, 2006, $ 55.00 hardcover.
The United States and Somalia stand as the only two
nations in the world that refuse to sign the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child, a document that lays
down the basic rights and moral standing of children. Nor
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has the U.S. attempted to adopt the comprehensive legislation
passed in many countries, such as England's The Children Act,
which focuses on all matters pertaining to children, with the
child's welfare squarely defining all legal actions.
James Dwyer, in his complexly argued book, The Relationship
Rights of Children, believes that, while the United States goes
far in protecting parents' rights, it is often at the expense of the
welfare of children. He does not offer why the United States
leans so far in favor of parents (there are complicated historical
and cultural reasons for our "difference"), but instead makes
a strong case, based on two centuries of philosophical reason-
ing, for why children deserve the same moral and legal con-
sideration as adults, even when this consideration steps on the
rights of adults.
The debate about children's rights, when it takes place
at all in this country, is usually carried on by legal scholars,
with the occasional contribution of social scientists who either
study child development or who offer measures of children's
economic and psychological well-being. With Dwyer, we are
offered extensive arguments from the philosopher giants, John
Stuart Mill, Immanuel Kant, John Rawls and others on the value
of the moral autonomy of the individual. These philosophers,
he admits, focus their arguments on adults, not children. In
fact, he notes, John Stuart Mill, in his theory of liberty, specifi-
cally states: "[this] is meant to apply only to human beings in
the maturity of their faculties." Not so for Dwyer. He makes a
compelling case that the same moral rights apply to children.
"Critically then, each of us competent adults has rights
of self-determination because it is generally assumed
as a moral matter that our interests matter, and matter
equally regardless of our status in society. This empirical
assumption certainly applies to children as well, and if
we are to respect children as equals, we must extend
the moral assumption to them also -that is, that their
interests matter as much as do adults' interests in state
decision making."
But how do children know what their interests are,
and if they did, how can they assert them? Children are, of
course, dependent upon adults to do so for them. But which
adults? Here Dwyer argues forcefully that although the law
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professes to promote "the best interests of children," in fact it
is far more protective of parental rights, and that these rights
are often based on a purely biological claim, not any test of
parental ability. Dwyer promotes a view of parents as caretak-
ers, not automatic owners of children. He focuses his criticism
on laws creating parental rights at birth, and protecting them
in events of abuse and neglect after birth. His solution is to
drastically re-formulate the law so that, among other require-
ments, a birth mother must sign a "Parental Vow" promis-
ing love and support within two days after birth in order to
become a legal parent, but the state may file a petition within
seven days to determine in a court proceeding whether the
mother is, in fact, unsuitable for one of many reasons, includ-
ing age, mental incapacity, past conduct of violence against
family members, etc. Fathers achieve legal parenthood only if
the birth mother consents and they are married. Fathers not
married to the mother can only be deemed legal parents if the
mother consents and the father petitions the court, passing all
the tests of adequate parenting. Non-biological adults may
also petition the court within 30 days and their claim will be
determined by the court. Following birth, similar strict tests
are applied in cases of abuse or neglect of children, allowing
the court to more easily terminate parental rights than is now
the case.
His view of children's rights privileges birth mothers but
gives little other advantage to biological ties. Unwed fathers
still have an obligation to support but not to access unless they
have passed all the above tests. Adults who have acted like
parents, or have firm attached relationships to children, like
stepfathers, have rights over non-involved biological fathers,
and a child may have more than two significant adults in his
life. From this perspective, attachment trumps biology and
a parent must earn the right to become and to continue as a
parent.
This concept of parents as caretakers or trustees rather than
the owners of children who have independent rights is much
more in keeping with the UN Convention on the Rights of the
Child and with most European efforts at establishing a code
of children's rights. Some of its obvious consequences would
be a move toward no corporal punishment and ultimately the
right of children themselves, as they grow older, to petition to
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"divorce" their parents-the course taken in Europe.
Grounded in a strong tradition of moral philosophy,
this child-centered approach adds valuable support to some
American legal scholars and others who have been moving
more timidly in this direction, most notably with a new re-
vision of the influential American Law Institutes' treatise on
Parent and Child where "de facto" parents (such as steppar-
ents) without biological ties would be given greater access
rights.
A limitation of this book is that Dwyer limits himself to
the "protective" rights of young children and does not wander
into the thornier "choice rights" of maturing adolescents. For
instance: does the protective state have the right to insist on
drug testing for children before they may join any after-school
activity, as the Supreme Court recently ruled? or, are the rights
of children served when in one courtroom a 13-year-old who
steals a candy bar may be given a lawyer and nearly all the
due process rights of a criminal defendant while down the
hall a 13-year-old whose physical custody is being determined
following divorce may have no voice or representation at all?
Perhaps this philosopher will tackle maturing children's rights
in his next book.
Mary Ann Mason
University of California, Berkeley
Alberto Alesina and Francesco Gianvassi, The Future of Europe:
Reform or Decline. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006. $ 24.95
hardcover.
With the ascendancy of market liberal ideas over the last
two decades, widely held assumptions about the role of gov-
ernment in social welfare have been undermined by market
liberals and their traditionalist allies who claim that state
welfare collectivism fosters economic stagnation, dependen-
cy, moral decline and other ills. In addition to producing do-
mestic empirical evidence to support their case, opponents of
welfare statism have often used comparative data to argue for
